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Abstract 
 
This article mainly analyzes primary documents of the French Foreign Ministry and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) Commission to examine the process through which Turkey became a second associate 
country of the EEC in 1963. In considering the origins of the problem of Turkish accession to the EU, the as-
sociation between Turkey and the EEC has interested not a few scholars; however, its establishing process has 
not been sufficiently examined. This study focuses on, 1) the differentiation of Turkey from Greece, which 
was a first associate member of the EEC, and, 2) the linkages between the process and the EEC’s parallel ne-
gotiations concerning accessions or associations with Western European countries and sub -Saharan African 
countries. In conclusion, the article clarifies Turkey’s  position in the EEC’s external relations at the time.  
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1. Introduction 
 
It must not be forgotten that, as far as the Europeanness of Turkey is concerned, the answer has been “Yes” since 
1949! […] And it was in 1963, when there was talk of an Association Agreement between Turkey and the 
Community, 1963, that it was implied that this Association Agreement was the precursor to possible accession to 
the Community. […] [I]f accession to the Community was being discussed as early as 1963, it is a little difficult to 
back-pedal now, saying: “We’ve suddenly realised that you are not European.” “Oh really? Very well. But, in that 
case, what were you doing in 1949?”1 
—Catherine Lalumière 
  
It needs to be clear whether or not the EU will accept Turkey. […] Turkey has been stalled since 1963. No EU 
member state was treated in such a way.2 
—Recep Erdoğan 
 
On September 12, 1963, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Turkish government signed an 
association agreement, known as the Ankara Agreement, which included a provision for Turkey’s future accession to 
the Community.3 This agreement has been one of the primary grounds on which Turkey’s accession has been 
promoted. Previous studies dealing with the issue of Turkey’s accession have therefore invariably referred to the 
Ankara Agreement and asked why Turkey’s accession has not been realized despite its conclusion.4 However, 
assuming that Turkey was eligible for membership and regarded as a part of Europe in 1963, such studies have been 
less interested in exploring why and how the association agreement was established.5 Hence, the problem is that the 
assumption that the EEC accepted Turkey’s membership when it signed the association agreement has been supported 
without much consideration about the making process of the agreement. Analyzing the complexity of the process of 
establishing the Ankara Agreement, this article will reveal that the EEC did not necessarily recognize Turkey as s firm 
candidate for membership in establishing the association. This study could eventually lead to a reconsideration of the 
origin of today’s EU-Turkey relations. 
Studies of Turkey’s association with the EEC have examined the reasons why Turkey pursued it and emphasized 
that Turkey’s main concern was its Westernization through the association.6 However, as they have considered the 
                                                        
1 Interview with Catherine Lalumière: Turkey and the European Union (Paris, 17 May 2006), 
https://www.cvce.eu/obj/interview_with_catherine_lalumiere_turkey_and_the_european_union_paris_17_may_2006-en-1c1f7e35-
4412-4b47-bdf2-af43ba0059c5.html (accessed March 23, 2020). 
2 “Erdoğan urges EU to be ‘sincere’ about Turkish accession”, Hürriyet Daily News, October 9, 2018, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-eu-to-be-sincere-about-turkish-accession-137674 (accessed March 23, 2020). 
3 Article 28, “As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the 
accession of Turkey to the Community.” The full text of the agreement, see, 
https://www.cvce.eu/obj/agreement_establishing_an_association_between_the_eec_and_turkey_ankara_12_september_1963-en-4
a2e37da-9c31-4909-a45d-de6a751091f7.html (accessed March 23, 2020). 
4 For example, Tozun S. Bahcheli, “Turkey and the EC: The Strains of Association”, Revue d’intégration européenne, 3:2 (1980), 
221–237; Selim Ilkin, “A History of Turkey’s Association with the European Community”, in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton, 
eds., Turkey and the European Community, (Opladen: Leske and Budrich, 1990), 35–49; Christopher Brewin, “Association status 
and the path to membership”, in Armand Clesse and Seyfi Tashan, eds., Turkey and the European Union: 2004 and beyond 
(Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2004), 149–174. 
5 As a typical example, see Mletem Müftüler-Bac, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 34:4 (1998), 242. 
6 Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Mehmet Döşemeci, 
Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Yonca Özer, 
“Association relationship with full membership in perspective: The ongoing significance of the Ankara Agreement”, in Çigdem 
Nas and Yonca Özer, eds., Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles, (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 
12–32; Id., “Relations between Turkey and the European Economic Community: An Association with a Full Membership 
EEC had few difficulties in accepting its association with Turkey, there have been few studies that have focused on 
the attitudes of the EEC’s side. Another reason may be that Greece established its association with the EEC before 
Turkey did. Since both Greece and Turkey were not only co-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the Council of Europe, but also regarded 
as less developed countries in these organizations, it has been assumed that, after establishing its association with 
Greece, the EEC naturally established a similar linkage with Turkey.7 
However, several scholars have highlighted the differences between the Greek and Turkish associations and the 
challenges of the latter. Focusing on the EEC’s attitudes, they have explained that the association with Greece did not 
automatically serve as a precedent for Turkey’s status and it was rather difficult for the EEC to accept the association 
with Turkey.8 For example, Sena Ceylanoglu has stressed the different economic conditions of the two countries: 
whereas Greece experienced rapid economic growth during the 1950s, as its annual growth rate reached 7% and its 
national income increased by 63.2%, the Turkish economy was aggravated by severe inflation, for which annual rate 
rose to 15% until 1959. Thus, Turkey ended up relying on the stabilization program of the OEEC and obtained a loan 
of 225 million dollars.9 In contrast, Eugen Krieger has pointed out that Charles de Gaulle’s security concerns made 
the association with Turkey more difficult than that with Greece because the aim of the former’s association was 
considered to be incorporated in NATO’s security policy, and more specifically in the United States’ strategy in the 
Mediterranean region.10 
Such studies have certainly been very valuable in terms of explaining the uniqueness of Turkey’s association with 
the EEC; however, by highlighting the differences between Greece and Turkey, they tended to overemphasize the 
peculiarity of the latter’s position. Although there were several different characteristics between the Greece’s 
association and the Turkey’s association with the EEC, we should not ignore certain similarities between them, 
namely in terms of targeting accession. The problem is that scholars have largely ignored that Turkey’s association 
was profoundly influenced by the parallel negotiations in which the Community was engaged, namely negotiations 
involving the accession of or association with Western European and sub-Saharan African countries. This article will 
explain how such questions interacted with the problem of the association between Turkey and the EEC. Specifically, 
it is argued that the Turkey’s association was distinct from the Greece’s association owing not only to the differences 
of their economic and political situations but also to changes in the EEC’s external conditions as a whole. As such, 
this article will clarify that the complicated relations between Turkey and the EU were grounded in the historical 
situation of the EEC during the 1950s–1960s. 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Objective”, in Sasha Toperich and Aylin Ünver Noi, eds., Turkey and Transatlantic Relations, (Wahington DC: Center for 
Transatlantic Relations, 2017), 57–68. 
7 Representatively, Elena Calandri, who has studied the establishment of the association between Greece and the EEC ( « La CEE et 
les relations extérieures 1958–1960 », in Antonio Varsori, ed., Inside the European Community; Actors and Politics in European 
Integration 1957–1972 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 399–431), has analyzed not the process of the establishment but the 
implementation of Turkey’s association. Elena Calandri, “A Special Relationship under Strain: Turkey and the EEC, 1963–1976”, 
Journal of European Integration History, 15:1 (2009), 57–75. 
8 Matthias M. Mayer, “Germany’s Preferences on the Ankara Agreement: Ministerial Actors between Cold War Security Concerns, 
Turkish European Ambitions and the Wirtschaftswunder”, Paper to be given at Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics of 
the ECPR, 25 to 27 September 2008, University of Latvia, Riga, 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.598.4821&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed June 3, 2020); Francesca 
Capoluongo, “”La Turquie fait partie de l’Europe” The Ankara Agreement: the path towards, the reasons behind”, Conference paper 
at Going Global. The History of EC/EU External Relations. A Jean Monnet Module on the History of European Integration, 
University of Trento, 2015, 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Francesca_Capoluongo/publication/284027922_La_Turquie_fait_partie_de_l'Europe_The_A
nkara_Agreement_the_path_towards_the_reasons_behind/links/564b125608ae295f64512d95/La-Turquie-fait-partie-de-lEurope-T
he-Ankara-Agreement-the-path-towards-the-reasons-behind.pdf (accessed June 3, 2020). 
9 Sena Ceylanoglu, Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Griechenland und die Türkei; Die Assoziationsabkommen im 
Vergleich(1959–1963) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004), 72–87. 
10 Eugen Krieger, Die Europakandidatur der Türkei; Der Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 
während der Assoziierungsverhandlungen mit der Türkei 1959–1963 (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 2006), 88–108. 
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221–237; Selim Ilkin, “A History of Turkey’s Association with the European Community”, in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton, 
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(Amsterdam: Dutch University Press, 2004), 149–174. 
5 As a typical example, see Mletem Müftüler-Bac, “The Never-Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union”, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 34:4 (1998), 242. 
6 Harun Arikan, Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Mehmet Döşemeci, 
Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism, and the EEC, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Yonca Özer, 
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Nas and Yonca Özer, eds., Turkey and EU Integration: Achievements and Obstacles, (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 
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In order to understand how the EEC’s policy towards Turkey was established, it is indispensable to analyze not 
only the relations between the member states but also their interplay with the EEC’s institutions. From this 
perspective, documents from the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France, the Archives 
Nationales Française, and the Historical Archives of the EEC Commission are consulted in this article. It is also 
grounded on the published official documents, the Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik des Bundesrepublik and the 
Documents Diplomatiques Français. Different from the previous studies, this article analyzes not only the primary 
documents concerning the relations between Turkey and the EEC but also those concerning the Community’s external 
relations as a whole. As a result, it will become apparent for the first time that the EEC’s attitudes towards Turkey 
were not solely determined by their bilateral relations but rather elaborated in a broader context. 
 
2. Pursuit of Association by Greece and Turkey and Conclusion of the Association with 
Greece (1959–1961) 
 
2.1: Applications for association by Greece and Turkey in 1959 
In June of 1959, the Greek government applied to the EEC Commission and the member states for an association 
according to the article 238 of the Treaty of Rome,11 and the Turkish government did the same in July of the same 
year. Since November 1958, when the French government refused the establishment of the Free Trade Area (FTA), 
which was to be constituted by the OEEC’s 17 members, the two countries had been concerned both with their 
relations with the EEC member states and their exclusion from the movement to create the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA).12 For these reasons, when Greece was forced to approach the EEC independently, Turkey 
decided to follow Greece.13 In addition to the similar situations of the two countries, Turkey, which had a 
long-standing rivalry with Greece, could not allow Greece to approach the EEC on its own. Therefore, from the 
beginning to the end of the negotiations, Turkey’s main interest was to obtain an equal status with Greece.14 
The EEC member states and the Commission did not agree on a response to Greece’s and Turkey’s applications for 
association because there were two conflicting policy directions in the Community, namely “the European approach,” 
which aimed at resuming FTA negotiations with European non-member states, particularly with the seven members 
of the later-formed EFTA, and “the global approach,” which focused on the interests of non-European countries.15 
Pursuing the “European approach,” the Benelux countries were opposed to establishing individual association with 
Greece and Turkey because they considered that doing so would hinder the construction of the European-wide FTA.16 
In contrast, the EEC Commission, which pursued the “global approach,” emphasized the need to begin negotiations 
with Greece and Turkey as soon as possible. The Commission regarded the two countries belonging not only to 
                                                        
11 “The Community may conclude with a third country, a union of States or an international organization agreements creating an 
association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures.” The full text of the treaty of Rome, 
see, 
https://www.cvce.eu/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_community_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6
-8a76-6b0b3252696e.html (accessed March 23, 2020). 
12 Roland Maurhofer, “Revisiting the Creation of EFTA: the British and the Swiss Case”, Journal of European Integration History, 
7:2 (2001), 71. 
13 Lorenz Plassmann, Comme dans une nuit de Pâques?: Les relations franco-grecques, 1944-1981 (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012), 
138–140; Heinz Kramer und Maurus Reinkowski, Die Türkei und Europa : Eine wechselhafte Beziehungsgeschichte (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 2008), 155–156. 
14 Arikan, op.cit., 53; Özer, op.cit., 57–59. 
15 For detail, see Kazuhiro Nose, “The “Acceleration” Decision in the EEC and the Development of European Integration: With 
Particular Reference to the French Position in the Negotiations (1959–1960),” The Shirin of the Journal of History, 96:5 (2013), 78–
81[in Japanese]. 
16 Archives du ministère des affaires étrangères, La Courneuve (hereafter, AMAE), DE-CE, no.692, télégramme de Carbonnel, 19 
juin 1959. 
Western Europe but also to the “Mediterranean-type developing countries,” which had economic characteristics 
similar to Tunisia.17 Thus, from the viewpoint of assistance to developing countries, it argued that “it is impossible to 
take a negative or hesitant attitude” towards Greece and Turkey.18 Owing to this disagreement, the Council of 
Ministers of the EEC decided to only open exploratory talks between the EEC Commission and the two countries.19 
However, when the exploratory talks opened in September and October, the EEC Commission had to recognize its 
difficulties in accepting Greece’s and Turkey’s demands. On the one hand, both countries had set their accession to 
the Community as their ultimate goal and proposed to establish a customs union with the EEC member states within 
the framework of the association in order to realize that aim as soon as possible. On the other hand, considering the 
differences of the economic conditions, they stressed the need for distinctions to be made between their obligations 
and those of EEC members in establishing the customs union, such that the six member states would be obliged to 
remove their trade restrictions against Greece and Turkey at the same pace as they did between themselves (i.e., 12 
years), whereas Greece requested the right to abolish its own restrictions in 24 years, and Turkey proposed to set a 
“preparatory period” of 10 or 12 years before it began removing its trade barriers. Thus, even while demanding to 
open the common market for their exportation, Greece and Turkey intended to maintain their own protective 
measures against the six countries. Both countries also requested to participate in discussions in the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission when the Community examined measures that could influence their economy, such as 
agricultural policy or associations with third parties. Furthermore, they each required financial assistance from the 
EEC; Greece requested 300 million dollars over a period of five years, and Turkey sought aid in the form of an 
annual disbursement of 100 million dollars.20 
The Commission determined that “even if concluded with a developing country, these proposals cannot constitute a 
rational basis for an association agreement” because they would create a clear imbalance between the commitments 
of Greece and Turkey and those of the Community. This imbalance was not negligible, as the EEC’s association with 
the two countries would set a precedent that could be extended to every candidate for association.21 For example, 
Robert Lemaignen, the Commissioner for the overseas territories, pointed out that acceding to the demands of Greece 
and Turkey could trigger similar demands in the African territories.22 From this perspective, in order to reduce the 
Community’s burden and maintain its freedom of action, the Commission saw the need not only to refuse Greece’s 
and Turkey’s involvement in the decision-making process but also to strengthen their obligations in connection with 
the establishment of the customs union.23 Although the Commission stressed the importance of relations with 
developing countries, it did not dare to permit the establishment of an association that would endanger the future of 
the Community. 
In the second round of talks in November and December 1959, the Commission asked the Greeks and Turkish to 
remove their trade restrictions sooner than they had expected and offered to admit other requests such as financial 
assistance in return for their liberalization efforts. 24  The differences between Greece and Turkey became 
                                                        
17 European Commission Historical Archives, Bruxelles (hereafter, ECHA), BAC 1/1971, no.27, note sur l’association de la Grèce à 
la Communauté, 4 septembre 1959. 
18 ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.27, Assoziierung von Entwicklungsländern mit der Gemeinschaft, 4 September 1959. 
19 ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.27, procès-verbal du débat intervenu lors de la réunion du Comité des représentants permanents du 16 
juillet 1959, 21 juillet 1959; ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.285, note du Conseil, 9 septembre 1959. 
20 ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.27 compte-rendu des conversations exploratoires entre les délégations de la Grèce et de la Commission 
(10–12 septembre 1959), 21 septembre 1959; ECHA, BAC 3/1978, no.285, compte-rendu des conversations exploratoires entre les 
délégations de la Turquie et de la Commission (28–30 septembre 1959), 3 octobre 1959. 
21 ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28, note de la Direction de l’Association avec les Pays Tiers, 31 octobre 1959. 
22 ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28 observations présentées par Lemaignen, 13 novembre 1959. 
23 ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28, note de la Direction de l’Association avec les Pays Tiers, 31 octobre 1959. 
24 ECHA, BAC 1/1971, no.28, compte-rendu de la deuxième phase des conversation exploratoires entre les délégations de la Grèce 
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perspective, documents from the archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de la France, the Archives 
Nationales Française, and the Historical Archives of the EEC Commission are consulted in this article. It is also 
grounded on the published official documents, the Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik des Bundesrepublik and the 
Documents Diplomatiques Français. Different from the previous studies, this article analyzes not only the primary 
documents concerning the relations between Turkey and the EEC but also those concerning the Community’s external 
relations as a whole. As a result, it will become apparent for the first time that the EEC’s attitudes towards Turkey 
were not solely determined by their bilateral relations but rather elaborated in a broader context. 
 
2. Pursuit of Association by Greece and Turkey and Conclusion of the Association with 
Greece (1959–1961) 
 
2.1: Applications for association by Greece and Turkey in 1959 
In June of 1959, the Greek government applied to the EEC Commission and the member states for an association 
according to the article 238 of the Treaty of Rome,11 and the Turkish government did the same in July of the same 
year. Since November 1958, when the French government refused the establishment of the Free Trade Area (FTA), 
which was to be constituted by the OEEC’s 17 members, the two countries had been concerned both with their 
relations with the EEC member states and their exclusion from the movement to create the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA).12 For these reasons, when Greece was forced to approach the EEC independently, Turkey 
decided to follow Greece.13 In addition to the similar situations of the two countries, Turkey, which had a 
long-standing rivalry with Greece, could not allow Greece to approach the EEC on its own. Therefore, from the 
beginning to the end of the negotiations, Turkey’s main interest was to obtain an equal status with Greece.14 
The EEC member states and the Commission did not agree on a response to Greece’s and Turkey’s applications for 
association because there were two conflicting policy directions in the Community, namely “the European approach,” 
which aimed at resuming FTA negotiations with European non-member states, particularly with the seven members 
of the later-formed EFTA, and “the global approach,” which focused on the interests of non-European countries.15 
Pursuing the “European approach,” the Benelux countries were opposed to establishing individual association with 
Greece and Turkey because they considered that doing so would hinder the construction of the European-wide FTA.16 
In contrast, the EEC Commission, which pursued the “global approach,” emphasized the need to begin negotiations 
with Greece and Turkey as soon as possible. The Commission regarded the two countries belonging not only to 
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Western Europe but also to the “Mediterranean-type developing countries,” which had economic characteristics 
similar to Tunisia.17 Thus, from the viewpoint of assistance to developing countries, it argued that “it is impossible to 
take a negative or hesitant attitude” towards Greece and Turkey.18 Owing to this disagreement, the Council of 
Ministers of the EEC decided to only open exploratory talks between the EEC Commission and the two countries.19 
However, when the exploratory talks opened in September and October, the EEC Commission had to recognize its 
difficulties in accepting Greece’s and Turkey’s demands. On the one hand, both countries had set their accession to 
the Community as their ultimate goal and proposed to establish a customs union with the EEC member states within 
the framework of the association in order to realize that aim as soon as possible. On the other hand, considering the 
differences of the economic conditions, they stressed the need for distinctions to be made between their obligations 
and those of EEC members in establishing the customs union, such that the six member states would be obliged to 
remove their trade restrictions against Greece and Turkey at the same pace as they did between themselves (i.e., 12 
years), whereas Greece requested the right to abolish its own restrictions in 24 years, and Turkey proposed to set a 
“preparatory period” of 10 or 12 years before it began removing its trade barriers. Thus, even while demanding to 
open the common market for their exportation, Greece and Turkey intended to maintain their own protective 
measures against the six countries. Both countries also requested to participate in discussions in the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission when the Community examined measures that could influence their economy, such as 
agricultural policy or associations with third parties. Furthermore, they each required financial assistance from the 
EEC; Greece requested 300 million dollars over a period of five years, and Turkey sought aid in the form of an 
annual disbursement of 100 million dollars.20 
The Commission determined that “even if concluded with a developing country, these proposals cannot constitute a 
rational basis for an association agreement” because they would create a clear imbalance between the commitments 
of Greece and Turkey and those of the Community. This imbalance was not negligible, as the EEC’s association with 
the two countries would set a precedent that could be extended to every candidate for association.21 For example, 
Robert Lemaignen, the Commissioner for the overseas territories, pointed out that acceding to the demands of Greece 
and Turkey could trigger similar demands in the African territories.22 From this perspective, in order to reduce the 
Community’s burden and maintain its freedom of action, the Commission saw the need not only to refuse Greece’s 
and Turkey’s involvement in the decision-making process but also to strengthen their obligations in connection with 
the establishment of the customs union.23 Although the Commission stressed the importance of relations with 
developing countries, it did not dare to permit the establishment of an association that would endanger the future of 
the Community. 
In the second round of talks in November and December 1959, the Commission asked the Greeks and Turkish to 
remove their trade restrictions sooner than they had expected and offered to admit other requests such as financial 
assistance in return for their liberalization efforts. 24  The differences between Greece and Turkey became 
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recognizable through their distinct responses to these requests; whereas Greece accepted the principle of reducing its 
trade barriers at the same pace as the EEC members, Turkey continued to seek the introduction of the preparatory 
period and unilateral liberalization by the Six.25  
In comparing these attitudes, the Commission concluded that the Greeks had adopted a more positive stance 
towards its requests than that of the Turkish.26 At the Council of Ministers, Jean Rey, then Commissioner for external 
relations, reported the progress of the exploratory talks and explained that Greece’s demands had become apparent 
and there was no need to continue the exploratory talks. However, Rey proposed that “concerning Turkey, although 
the need for a certain parallelism between the two series of exploratory talks is desired by the Council and always 
present in the spirit of the Commission, it has become necessary to proceed separately with them in practice.”27 
Based on Rey’s assessment, the member states decided to open official negotiations with Greece; however, they did 
not make any decision in relation to Turkey. Thus, Greece began to be privileged than Turkey owing to its 
commitments to trade liberalization, i.e., the presence or absence of a preparatory period. This differentiation would 
facilitate the establishment of Greece’s association while making it more difficult to reach an agreement with Turkey. 
 
2.2: Conclusion of the association agreement with Greece and tough negotiations with Turkey 
The EEC’s decision to separate its negotiations with Greece and Turkey raised a new problem. Although the 
Commission had assumed that the association with Greece and Turkey would set a precedent for other associations, it 
could no longer depend on this assumption by allowing for the gap between the statuses of the two countries. Instead, 
the Commission introduced a new concept of association with Greece that “the objective is to promote the integration 
of the Greek economy to the Community […] thus not within mere general assistance for developing countries.”28 
That is, the Commission began to regard the association with Greece as an exceptional case that differed from those 
with other countries, including Turkey. 
This idea was not unanimously agreed by the member states; however, they were persuaded to establish the 
association with Greece in an exceptional manner through several incidents in May 1960. First, the “acceleration” of 
the construction of the common market determined by the EEC reduced the risks of establishing individual 
association with Greece; by introducing the common external tariff earlier than planned, this decision sought to 
equalize the treatment of all non-member states and thus set back efforts to establish preferential relations between 
EEC and EFTA members.29 Under these conditions, it became difficult for the Benelux countries to resist bilateral 
negotiations with Greece based on the idea of “the European approach.” 
Second, the occurrence of a military coup d’état in Turkey at the end of the month revealed that country’s unstable 
political conditions. Before the coup, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu had protested against the delay in the 
country’s negotiations compared with the evolution of Greece’s negotiations.30 However, Zorlu was arrested along 
with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and set to be executed by military officers. Amidst this internal disorder, the 
talks between the EEC and Turkey could not help suspending until the restoration of civilian control. From the 
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janvier 1960. 
29 For detail, see Nose, op.cit., 70–104. 
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viewpoint of the association’s formative process, the military coup was an event that justified the differentiation of 
Turkey from Greece. The EEC member states and the Commission had to recognize that, although the situations of 
the two countries had appeared to be similar, they were in effect highly distinct and thus required different solutions.31 
Finally, in the same month, tensions between the East and West intensified in the aftermath of the U-2 incident and 
the failure of the Four Power Paris summit. Prior to these events, the Greek government had repeatedly alerted the 
Western countries to the increasing pressure being exerted upon the region from the Soviet Union.32 Situated at the 
forefront of the Cold War, Greece had been heretofore supported by the United States; however, the U.S. had little 
sympathy for Greece’s sense of urgency.33 In contrast, West Germany considered the maintenance of the government 
led by Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, which held a strong anti-communist policy, to be critical not only for 
the defense of Greece but also for the whole of Western Europe.34 The crisis provoked in May 1960 made other 
countries reconsider the political importance of the association with Greece. Particularly, together with West Germany, 
the French government began to pursue actively the EEC’s association with Greece, which was to be an important 
step for its conclusion. In July 1960, when Karamanlis visited Paris for a meeting with de Gaulle, the French 
President ensured the doubling of its import of tobacco and a loan of 100 million dollars in the framework of the 
association.35 The Greek press accordingly reported that “France was […] the most conciliatory toward the Greece’s 
demands among the Six and most conscious of the political interest of the association between Greece and the 
Common Market.”36 
Under these circumstances, the Community was reaching a consensus on the exceptional nature and the outline of 
the association with Greece; to establish the customs union in a reciprocal manner, the Community ensured financial 
assistance through a special loan program and introduced exceptional measures to promote the export of vital 
products for the Greek economy, such as tobacco or citrus fruits. Meanwhile, its relations with Turkey remained 
ambiguous. In October 1960, the EEC Commission opened a preparatory meeting with the new Turkish government 
in order to restore the talks that had been interrupted by the coup. Emphasizing the economic similarities between 
Greece and its own country, the Turkish delegation clarified its intention to seek an analogous association. Moreover, 
based on the plan to re-establish its customs duty from January 1961, Turkey hoped to conclude an agreement within 
three months and effectuate it beginning on January 1, 1961.37 Thus, the new Turkish government intended to 
accelerate its stagnant talks with the Community and reach an agreement similar to that achieved for Greece in terms 
of both scheduling and the economic characteristics. 
The EEC Commission could not unconditionally accept the Turkish demands; it asked the Turkish to accept the 
same obligations as Greece if they sought to receive the same treatment. The most unacceptable element of the 
proposal for the Commission was the concept of the preparatory period during which the EEC member states would 
unilaterally reduce their tariff and increase their quotas even while Turkey maintained its own barriers. Therefore, the 
Commission confirmed that a similar association to Greece’s could not be realizable unless Turkey relented on its 
demand for the preparatory period. Eventually, the Turkish delegation abandoned the proposal for the preparatory 
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recognizable through their distinct responses to these requests; whereas Greece accepted the principle of reducing its 
trade barriers at the same pace as the EEC members, Turkey continued to seek the introduction of the preparatory 
period and unilateral liberalization by the Six.25  
In comparing these attitudes, the Commission concluded that the Greeks had adopted a more positive stance 
towards its requests than that of the Turkish.26 At the Council of Ministers, Jean Rey, then Commissioner for external 
relations, reported the progress of the exploratory talks and explained that Greece’s demands had become apparent 
and there was no need to continue the exploratory talks. However, Rey proposed that “concerning Turkey, although 
the need for a certain parallelism between the two series of exploratory talks is desired by the Council and always 
present in the spirit of the Commission, it has become necessary to proceed separately with them in practice.”27 
Based on Rey’s assessment, the member states decided to open official negotiations with Greece; however, they did 
not make any decision in relation to Turkey. Thus, Greece began to be privileged than Turkey owing to its 
commitments to trade liberalization, i.e., the presence or absence of a preparatory period. This differentiation would 
facilitate the establishment of Greece’s association while making it more difficult to reach an agreement with Turkey. 
 
2.2: Conclusion of the association agreement with Greece and tough negotiations with Turkey 
The EEC’s decision to separate its negotiations with Greece and Turkey raised a new problem. Although the 
Commission had assumed that the association with Greece and Turkey would set a precedent for other associations, it 
could no longer depend on this assumption by allowing for the gap between the statuses of the two countries. Instead, 
the Commission introduced a new concept of association with Greece that “the objective is to promote the integration 
of the Greek economy to the Community […] thus not within mere general assistance for developing countries.”28 
That is, the Commission began to regard the association with Greece as an exceptional case that differed from those 
with other countries, including Turkey. 
This idea was not unanimously agreed by the member states; however, they were persuaded to establish the 
association with Greece in an exceptional manner through several incidents in May 1960. First, the “acceleration” of 
the construction of the common market determined by the EEC reduced the risks of establishing individual 
association with Greece; by introducing the common external tariff earlier than planned, this decision sought to 
equalize the treatment of all non-member states and thus set back efforts to establish preferential relations between 
EEC and EFTA members.29 Under these conditions, it became difficult for the Benelux countries to resist bilateral 
negotiations with Greece based on the idea of “the European approach.” 
Second, the occurrence of a military coup d’état in Turkey at the end of the month revealed that country’s unstable 
political conditions. Before the coup, Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu had protested against the delay in the 
country’s negotiations compared with the evolution of Greece’s negotiations.30 However, Zorlu was arrested along 
with Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and set to be executed by military officers. Amidst this internal disorder, the 
talks between the EEC and Turkey could not help suspending until the restoration of civilian control. From the 
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viewpoint of the association’s formative process, the military coup was an event that justified the differentiation of 
Turkey from Greece. The EEC member states and the Commission had to recognize that, although the situations of 
the two countries had appeared to be similar, they were in effect highly distinct and thus required different solutions.31 
Finally, in the same month, tensions between the East and West intensified in the aftermath of the U-2 incident and 
the failure of the Four Power Paris summit. Prior to these events, the Greek government had repeatedly alerted the 
Western countries to the increasing pressure being exerted upon the region from the Soviet Union.32 Situated at the 
forefront of the Cold War, Greece had been heretofore supported by the United States; however, the U.S. had little 
sympathy for Greece’s sense of urgency.33 In contrast, West Germany considered the maintenance of the government 
led by Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, which held a strong anti-communist policy, to be critical not only for 
the defense of Greece but also for the whole of Western Europe.34 The crisis provoked in May 1960 made other 
countries reconsider the political importance of the association with Greece. Particularly, together with West Germany, 
the French government began to pursue actively the EEC’s association with Greece, which was to be an important 
step for its conclusion. In July 1960, when Karamanlis visited Paris for a meeting with de Gaulle, the French 
President ensured the doubling of its import of tobacco and a loan of 100 million dollars in the framework of the 
association.35 The Greek press accordingly reported that “France was […] the most conciliatory toward the Greece’s 
demands among the Six and most conscious of the political interest of the association between Greece and the 
Common Market.”36 
Under these circumstances, the Community was reaching a consensus on the exceptional nature and the outline of 
the association with Greece; to establish the customs union in a reciprocal manner, the Community ensured financial 
assistance through a special loan program and introduced exceptional measures to promote the export of vital 
products for the Greek economy, such as tobacco or citrus fruits. Meanwhile, its relations with Turkey remained 
ambiguous. In October 1960, the EEC Commission opened a preparatory meeting with the new Turkish government 
in order to restore the talks that had been interrupted by the coup. Emphasizing the economic similarities between 
Greece and its own country, the Turkish delegation clarified its intention to seek an analogous association. Moreover, 
based on the plan to re-establish its customs duty from January 1961, Turkey hoped to conclude an agreement within 
three months and effectuate it beginning on January 1, 1961.37 Thus, the new Turkish government intended to 
accelerate its stagnant talks with the Community and reach an agreement similar to that achieved for Greece in terms 
of both scheduling and the economic characteristics. 
The EEC Commission could not unconditionally accept the Turkish demands; it asked the Turkish to accept the 
same obligations as Greece if they sought to receive the same treatment. The most unacceptable element of the 
proposal for the Commission was the concept of the preparatory period during which the EEC member states would 
unilaterally reduce their tariff and increase their quotas even while Turkey maintained its own barriers. Therefore, the 
Commission confirmed that a similar association to Greece’s could not be realizable unless Turkey relented on its 
demand for the preparatory period. Eventually, the Turkish delegation abandoned the proposal for the preparatory 
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period and agreed to reduce its trade barriers at the same pace as the EEC member states.38 Hence, in its pursuit of 
the same status as that achieved for Greece, the new government showed more positive attitudes towards trade 
liberalization than the former government had demonstrated. 
Despite this adjustment, the Commission was inclined to maintain the distinctions between Greece and Turkey. 
When the meeting was reported to other Commissioners, some questioned the need to force the Turkish to 
compromise to the same degree as Greece, as they regretted that the principle of the association with Greece, i.e., the 
establishment of a customs union, had been established without sufficient consideration. Based on that decision, the 
Commission had to face criticism not only from Greece but also from the EEC member states because the negotiating 
principle turned out to be inappropriate and excessive.39 Thus, although the Commission had criticized the concept of 
the preparatory period and forced the Turkish to abandon it at the last meeting, it began to reconsider its decision.40 
In other words, the Commission recognized the experimental character of the association with Greece and sought to 
determine a different model of association with Turkey rather than holding that country to the same strict conditions. 
As a further consequence, it determined to prioritize concluding the negotiations with Greece and postpone those with 
Turkey for some time.41 
In March of that year, as the negotiations with Greece were concluding, the Commission made a report in which it 
reconfirmed the differentiation between Greece and Turkey. Specifically, Commissioner Rey indicated that the 
Community should consider “the difficulties to conclude a customs union with a developing country [that] the 
difficult negotiation with Greece highlighted, Turkey’s financial situation […], which has proved to be more serious 
than was thought [, and] the new association regime of overseas territories […] under discussion.” According to Rey, 
it was inappropriate for the Community to pursue an association with Turkey similar to that established with Greece 
because of the overall difficulty of the objective and the more serious economic conditions in the former, as well as 
the precedent that would be set for future associations. Rather, the Commissioner argued that associations involving 
the establishment of a customs union were useful only to countries that had “sufficient prospects for the possibility of 
real integration into the Community and […] a very clear political will for the approximation to the Common Market.” 
In line with these assumptions, he concluded in cases when countries (such as Turkey) could not fulfill the conditions 
mentioned above, the Community’s action should be limited to measures compatible with the general 
most-favored-nation treatment, which meant the reduction of the common external tariff that influenced all 
non-member states in an indiscriminate manner and providing loans based on the idea of assistance.42 
The EEC member governments were generally more cautious than the Commission because they doubted the 
Turkish would accept these conditions. Mainly, West Germany expected to conclude the association with Turkey as 
soon as possible because, like Greece, Turkey was experiencing pressure from the Soviet Union and its political 
situation had to be improved following the coup.43 As a result, the Council of Ministers was only able to decide to 
resume negotiations with Turkey on the condition that the Commission would not represent the Community’s 
perspective.44 Although the member states questioned the Commission’s approach, they were not yet prepared to 
define an adequate form of association with Turkey and needed to buy some time. Thus, after the Greek government 
and the EEC Commission signed an association agreement on March 30, 1961, the negotiations with Turkey were 
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reopened the next month (nearly a year after the coup); however, this entailed no more than an exchange of opinions 
and closed without programming a subsequent meeting.45 
As shown in this section, although Greece and Turkey had both applied for an association with the EEC in the 
summer of 1959, at the point that the former had concluded its agreement, the latter had not even defined the 
principles of its association and had far to go in its negotiations. This consequence was inevitable owing to the 
justification of the association with Greece based on its exceptional status and the discrimination applied in 
distinguishing Turkey from Greece. In order to overcome the standstill, the Turkish government would make the 
crucial decision to accept the introduction of the preparatory period, which meant that Turkey no longer pursued the 
same status as that of Greece. 
 
3. From Comparisons with Greece to a Precedent of Association for Western European 
Countries (1961–1962) 
 
3.1: Turkish concession in the turbulent days of the EEC’s external relations 
The different situations between Greece and Turkey provoked discontent in public opinions in the latter country, 
and some publications attributed the unenthusiastic stance of the EEC to cultural prejudice against Turkey. For 
example, the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet (The Republic) charged that “the Europeans demonstrated that they 
considered the Turkish as Orientals.” Similarly, Milliyet (The Nationality) identified “the spirit of Christian solidarity” 
as a barrier to Turkey’s association with the Community.46 Nonetheless, at the end of August 1961, the Turkish 
government notified the EEC Commission and the member governments of its acceptance of the preparatory period.47 
Indeed, it did not renounce the ultimate goal of establishing a customs union with the EEC members; however, it had 
determined to accept a different approach than that adopted by Greece. 
This compromise was one of the most significant turning points in the process of establishing an agreement 
between Turkey and the Community. Although it noted a number of points for improvement, the EEC Commission 
underlined the importance of the concession through which Turkey came close to the Commission’s preference and, 
more essentially, withdrew its demand to obtain equal status with Greece.48 Thanks to this compromise, the EEC 
member states and the Commission were able to agree to the basic framework of the association with Turkey, the first 
step of which was the preparatory period to prepare Turkey’s economy for the establishment of a customs union.49 
Thus, the outline of the association between Turkey and the EEC was finally established two years after the former’s 
application. 
One of the reasons why the Turkish government conceded was that the post-coup government perceived greater 
political importance from the association than the former government had considered. The new government was 
conscious of its undemocratic origins and, therefore, enthusiastic about approaching the Western civilization through 
an association with the EEC. Thus, Cihan İren, trade minister under the military government and new delegate in the 
negotiations with the EEC, dropped most of Turkey’s previous demands in order to conclude an agreement immediately 
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period and agreed to reduce its trade barriers at the same pace as the EEC member states.38 Hence, in its pursuit of 
the same status as that achieved for Greece, the new government showed more positive attitudes towards trade 
liberalization than the former government had demonstrated. 
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the establishment of a customs union were useful only to countries that had “sufficient prospects for the possibility of 
real integration into the Community and […] a very clear political will for the approximation to the Common Market.” 
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and the EEC Commission signed an association agreement on March 30, 1961, the negotiations with Turkey were 
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reopened the next month (nearly a year after the coup); however, this entailed no more than an exchange of opinions 
and closed without programming a subsequent meeting.45 
As shown in this section, although Greece and Turkey had both applied for an association with the EEC in the 
summer of 1959, at the point that the former had concluded its agreement, the latter had not even defined the 
principles of its association and had far to go in its negotiations. This consequence was inevitable owing to the 
justification of the association with Greece based on its exceptional status and the discrimination applied in 
distinguishing Turkey from Greece. In order to overcome the standstill, the Turkish government would make the 
crucial decision to accept the introduction of the preparatory period, which meant that Turkey no longer pursued the 
same status as that of Greece. 
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and some publications attributed the unenthusiastic stance of the EEC to cultural prejudice against Turkey. For 
example, the daily newspaper Cumhuriyet (The Republic) charged that “the Europeans demonstrated that they 
considered the Turkish as Orientals.” Similarly, Milliyet (The Nationality) identified “the spirit of Christian solidarity” 
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Indeed, it did not renounce the ultimate goal of establishing a customs union with the EEC members; however, it had 
determined to accept a different approach than that adopted by Greece. 
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between Turkey and the Community. Although it noted a number of points for improvement, the EEC Commission 
underlined the importance of the concession through which Turkey came close to the Commission’s preference and, 
more essentially, withdrew its demand to obtain equal status with Greece.48 Thanks to this compromise, the EEC 
member states and the Commission were able to agree to the basic framework of the association with Turkey, the first 
step of which was the preparatory period to prepare Turkey’s economy for the establishment of a customs union.49 
Thus, the outline of the association between Turkey and the EEC was finally established two years after the former’s 
application. 
One of the reasons why the Turkish government conceded was that the post-coup government perceived greater 
political importance from the association than the former government had considered. The new government was 
conscious of its undemocratic origins and, therefore, enthusiastic about approaching the Western civilization through 
an association with the EEC. Thus, Cihan İren, trade minister under the military government and new delegate in the 
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by arguing that “[r]ather than thinking in terms of a few exportable goods, we should approach the negotiations from a 
much broader perspective.”50 
In addition to this change in Turkey’s approach, it is indispensable to remember that the month of August 1961 
marked a crucial moment for the EEC. On August 1, 1961, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan applied for 
accession to the EEC. The British application had the potential to change not only its own bilateral relations with the 
Community but also would impact multilateral relations within the whole of Western Europe. Following the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland also applied for accession to the EEC. At the end of that year, Austria, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, the three neutral countries within the EFTA, did not seek accession, but rather applied for 
association with the EEC. In February 1962, Spain also requested an association with the Community. 
The wave of change was not confined to Europe; Israel requested the establishment of some kind of special 
relations with the EEC in July 1961, followed by Iran in June 1962. In June 1961, the European Parliamentary 
Assembly invited parliamentary members from the African countries that had become independent from France and 
Belgium to participate in “Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference” to prepare negotiations to update the association, 
which had been stipulated in the colonial era. Thus, the British application for accession triggered a series of requests, 
and a number of countries began to revise their relations with the EEC. 
Underlying the Turkish compromise on the preparatory period were signs of change in the external relations of the 
EEC as a whole. Under these conditions, Turkey would deepen its isolation in Western Europe if it persisted in the 
demand for equal status with Greece and could not advance the negotiations with the Community. However, the 
Turkish concession did not completely remove the obstacles to an agreement. In particular, although the introduction 
of the preparatory period had been approved, there remained the question of whether or not a customs union should 
ultimately be established between Turkey and the EEC members. 
 
3.2: France’s reluctance to establish a customs union with Turkey 
The Turkish government certainly accepted the introduction of the preparatory period; however, it continued to 
pursue the establishment of a customs union with the EEC members as its ultimate goal. Meanwhile, as mentioned 
above, the EEC Commission considered that the establishment of a customs union was an exceptional objective of 
association limited to the Greek case. The Commission aimed to reach an agreement with Turkey only on the 
preparatory period and viewed the Turkish association in the form of “a convention of economic, financial and 
commercial cooperation,” valid only for five to seven years.51 Thus, despite the Turkish concession, there remained 
the question of whether or not Turkey and the Community would establish a customs union after the preparatory 
period. In other words, the Community had to decide if it would ultimately guarantee Turkey equal status with Greece, 
even if each association took different courses. 
Among the EEC member states, West Germany and France took contrasting attitudes.52 On the one hand, the 
former, accommodating the Turkish demand, suggested that the preparatory period should be automatically 
transferred to the transitional period during which the establishment of a customs union was undertaken. By fixing 
the schedule to establish the customs union from the beginning, Germany sought to reduce the differences between 
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Greece and Turkey within each association because of its political idea that Turkey had to be anchored to the Western 
Alliance in a similar manner that Greece did.53 
On the other hand, although France had also recognized the geopolitical importance of the association with Greece, 
it did not adopt that viewpoint in relation to the association with Turkey. France emphasized the economic differences 
between Greece and Turkey and doubted the possibility of establishing a customs union with the latter, proposing that 
the regime should be left vacant after the preparatory period. Whereas they regarded Greece as a future member state, 
the French argued that Turkey’s accession to or close association with the EEC would destroy the homogeneity of the 
Community.54 
Why was France so negative about associating with Turkey? According to the review of the country’s permanent 
representative of the EEC after finishing the negotiations, France did not overestimate Turkey’s geopolitical 
importance and took into account its backward economy and unstable financial condition; thus, France took a realistic 
perspective in considering the association with Turkey.55 Nevertheless, according to Francis Huré, the French Chargé 
d’Affaire in Turkey, “the political and military status of Greece is not naturally judged superior or equal compared to 
that of Turkey: Greece’s economic and financial situation does not seem better or more worthy than Turkey’s.”56 
Considering these views, we cannot say that the backwardness of the Turkish economy was the decisive factor 
influencing France’s position. 
To understand the French attitude, we cannot ignore that the Turkish government had aggravated its relation with 
France following the coup when Turkish President Cemal Gürsel expressed positive support for the independence 
movement in Algeria. Gürsel permitted the “Front de libération nationale” to open an office in Ankara, and, in 
December 1960, the Turkish government first voted in favor of the United Nations resolution recognizing the 
Algerian’s self-determination and independence, thus clarifying its critical stance towards France.57 Not hiding his 
anger at the Turkish, de Gaulle ordered the withdrawal of the ambassador from the country.58 
In contrast, even after the coup, relations between West Germany and Turkey were close as the recruitment 
agreement was signed between the two countries in October 1961.59 Were the contrasting attitudes of France and 
Germany due to differing political relations between the two countries and Turkey? We cannot say yes, as the two 
countries were also conflicted with regard to the association with sub-Saharan African and other Western European 
countries. Therefore, to understand the attitudes of France and Germany, it is crucial to consider the Turkish case in 
the context of the EEC’s overall external relations. 
 
3.3: Association with Turkey as a precedent for association with other European countries 
After the negotiations with Turkey resumed in April 1961, they were suspended again for over a year. During this 
period of interruption, the EEC rather engaged in negotiations with the EFTA members and sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
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Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland also applied for accession to the EEC. At the end of that year, Austria, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, the three neutral countries within the EFTA, did not seek accession, but rather applied for 
association with the EEC. In February 1962, Spain also requested an association with the Community. 
The wave of change was not confined to Europe; Israel requested the establishment of some kind of special 
relations with the EEC in July 1961, followed by Iran in June 1962. In June 1961, the European Parliamentary 
Assembly invited parliamentary members from the African countries that had become independent from France and 
Belgium to participate in “Eurafrican Parliamentary Conference” to prepare negotiations to update the association, 
which had been stipulated in the colonial era. Thus, the British application for accession triggered a series of requests, 
and a number of countries began to revise their relations with the EEC. 
Underlying the Turkish compromise on the preparatory period were signs of change in the external relations of the 
EEC as a whole. Under these conditions, Turkey would deepen its isolation in Western Europe if it persisted in the 
demand for equal status with Greece and could not advance the negotiations with the Community. However, the 
Turkish concession did not completely remove the obstacles to an agreement. In particular, although the introduction 
of the preparatory period had been approved, there remained the question of whether or not a customs union should 
ultimately be established between Turkey and the EEC members. 
 
3.2: France’s reluctance to establish a customs union with Turkey 
The Turkish government certainly accepted the introduction of the preparatory period; however, it continued to 
pursue the establishment of a customs union with the EEC members as its ultimate goal. Meanwhile, as mentioned 
above, the EEC Commission considered that the establishment of a customs union was an exceptional objective of 
association limited to the Greek case. The Commission aimed to reach an agreement with Turkey only on the 
preparatory period and viewed the Turkish association in the form of “a convention of economic, financial and 
commercial cooperation,” valid only for five to seven years.51 Thus, despite the Turkish concession, there remained 
the question of whether or not Turkey and the Community would establish a customs union after the preparatory 
period. In other words, the Community had to decide if it would ultimately guarantee Turkey equal status with Greece, 
even if each association took different courses. 
Among the EEC member states, West Germany and France took contrasting attitudes.52 On the one hand, the 
former, accommodating the Turkish demand, suggested that the preparatory period should be automatically 
transferred to the transitional period during which the establishment of a customs union was undertaken. By fixing 
the schedule to establish the customs union from the beginning, Germany sought to reduce the differences between 
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the regime should be left vacant after the preparatory period. Whereas they regarded Greece as a future member state, 
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importance and took into account its backward economy and unstable financial condition; thus, France took a realistic 
perspective in considering the association with Turkey.55 Nevertheless, according to Francis Huré, the French Chargé 
d’Affaire in Turkey, “the political and military status of Greece is not naturally judged superior or equal compared to 
that of Turkey: Greece’s economic and financial situation does not seem better or more worthy than Turkey’s.”56 
Considering these views, we cannot say that the backwardness of the Turkish economy was the decisive factor 
influencing France’s position. 
To understand the French attitude, we cannot ignore that the Turkish government had aggravated its relation with 
France following the coup when Turkish President Cemal Gürsel expressed positive support for the independence 
movement in Algeria. Gürsel permitted the “Front de libération nationale” to open an office in Ankara, and, in 
December 1960, the Turkish government first voted in favor of the United Nations resolution recognizing the 
Algerian’s self-determination and independence, thus clarifying its critical stance towards France.57 Not hiding his 
anger at the Turkish, de Gaulle ordered the withdrawal of the ambassador from the country.58 
In contrast, even after the coup, relations between West Germany and Turkey were close as the recruitment 
agreement was signed between the two countries in October 1961.59 Were the contrasting attitudes of France and 
Germany due to differing political relations between the two countries and Turkey? We cannot say yes, as the two 
countries were also conflicted with regard to the association with sub-Saharan African and other Western European 
countries. Therefore, to understand the attitudes of France and Germany, it is crucial to consider the Turkish case in 
the context of the EEC’s overall external relations. 
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After the negotiations with Turkey resumed in April 1961, they were suspended again for over a year. During this 
period of interruption, the EEC rather engaged in negotiations with the EFTA members and sub-Saharan African 
countries. 
                                                        
53 Ceylanoglu, op.cit., 192–197; Krieger, op.cit., 82. 
54 AMAE, Europe, Turquie, no. 121, note de M. Ulrich, 22 septembre 1961. 
55 AN, 19840343, no.96, l’ambassadeur représentant permanent de la France auprès des Communautés européennes à Couve de 
Murville, 5 juillet 1963. 
56 AMAE, Europe, Turquie, no.121, Francis Huré à Couve de Murville, 28 juin 1962. 
57 Eyüp Ersoy, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62)’, Turkish Studies, 13:4, 2012, 689–
690; Tancrède Josseran, « La Turquie et la Guerre d’Algérie, un tiers-mondisme atlantique? », Les clés du Moyaent-Orient, 2012, 
https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/La-Turquie-et-la-Guerre-d-Algerie.html (accessed March 23, 2020). 
58 Ceylanoglu, op.cit., 201. 
59 Günal Incesu, Ankara-Bonn-Brüssel: Die deutsche-türkischen Beziehungen und die Beitrittsbemühungen der Türkei in die 
Europäische Gemeinschaft, 1959–1987, (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2014), 127–128. 
89External Policy of the European Economic Community dur-ing the Association Negotiations with Turkey(1959–63)
―Reconsidering the origin of EU-Turkey relations―
From April 1960, when the French territories and Belgian Congo successively attained independence, the future 
relations between the EEC and the independent African countries became controversial. A significant point of 
controversy was whether the EEC should maintain its special relations with the region defined by the Treaty of Rome. 
Backed by Italy and Belgium, France argued that the Community was responsible for sub-Saharan Africa and should 
give priority to providing assistance to that region. In contrast, the Netherlands and West Germany stressed the need 
for assistance towards all developing countries.60 
Under these circumstances, at the Council of Ministers in July 1961, West Germany suggested abolishing specific 
tariff preferences for the ex-colonial African countries and instead reducing the common external tariff.61 It should be 
noted that this proposition was similar to what the Commission had suggested in relation to the association with 
Turkey. According to the German idea, true economic independence of the African countries, which was a primary 
objective of their association with the Community, could be achieved not through tariff preferences but rather by 
strengthening financial assistance to improve African infrastructures and to enable those countries to diversify their 
production. 
The French government insisted on the maintenance of the tariff preference because it would be impossible to 
convince the Africans to accept seemingly more disadvantageous conditions than those of the existing association. 
Thus, leaving aside their economic effectiveness, the French saw a need to maintain the tariff preferences based on 
political considerations. In this sense, the attitudes of France and West Germany regarding the association with the 
sub-Saharan African countries were opposite of those concerning the association with Turkey. Léopold Senghor, 
Senegal’s first president, argued that the German attitude would force the African countries to approach the 
Communist bloc.62 This criticism was based on the same logic used by West Germany to advocate the association 
with Turkey. 
Considering the strong ties linking France and sub-Saharan Africa from the colonial era and those between 
Germany and Turkey from the Ottoman era, it might seem inevitable that France and West Germany came into 
conflict over the EEC’s respective relations with Turkey and sub-Saharan Africa. In effect, trade between France and 
the sub-Saharan African countries and between West Germany and Turkey accounted for a large portion of the EEC’s 
commercial relations.63 Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the following statement by Rolf Lahr, secretary of state in the 
German Foreign Ministry, at the Council of Ministers in October 1961: “it will be difficult to make the public opinion 
of Turkey admit that this European country [i.e., Turkey], so important for Western Europe, must be treated more 
unfavorably than the African countries that recently achieved independence by the European Economic 
Community.”64 For West Germany, Turkey was not only a traditional partner but also an essential partner as a part of 
European countries. 
In fact, West Germany actively sought to establish special relations with other European counties as well as Turkey. 
In the second half of 1960, Chancellor Adenauer, who was an active supporter of Franco-German entente, was 
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succeeded as the leader of Germany’s European policy by Federal Minister for Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard, who 
sought to build the special relations between the EEC and the EFTA.65 Lahr explained the importance of the EEC’s 
relations with European countries by arguing that “[c]ountries like Switzerland and Austria, which are historically, 
spiritually and economically regarded as the heartland of Europe […] cannot be placed on the same level with Korea, 
Paraguay or Ethiopia.” Lahr was concerned about what he saw as the inadequate progress of the negotiations with 
European countries except for the United Kingdom compared with the negotiations with sub-Saharan Africa. To 
overcome this tendency, he placed great importance on the association with Turkey, which would give impetus to 
associations with Portugal, Island and Spain, accessions of Denmark and Norway, and establishing some sort of 
special relations with Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden. In that sense, Lahr proposed to avoid compromises on the 
association with sub-Saharan Africa as a negotiating tactic to establish the EEC’s external policy with an emphasis on 
establishing relations with the Western European countries. Notably, he considered it indispensable to extract a 
compromise from France on Turkey in exchange for the conclusion of the association with the African countries.66 
Meanwhile, France was opposed to association with the EFTA members.67 As Maurice Ulrich, a specialist in the 
European integration in the French Foreign Ministry, reported, the French government recognized the risk that the 
solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and Europe could be undermined if the EEC disregarded its relations with the 
non-member states in Western Europe. At the same time, however, it could not ignore certain disadvantages that 
accrue from their accession or association: 1) increased economic and financial costs due to more intensified 
competition among the agricultural producer countries and financial assistance to Europe’s developing countries; 2) 
the deterioration of the economic model institutionalized by the Treaty of Rome through a number of exceptions; 3) 
delays in the Community’s activity provoked by the increasing number of member states or associate states; and 4) 
difficulties in constructing a political Europe owing to the intervention of most European countries, which were 
unenthusiastic about the project.68 
In this context, Jean-Marc Bogner, French permanent representative to the EEC, argued that “in view of […] the 
negotiations that the Community is conducting with many European countries that demanded their accession to the 
Treaty of Rome, the Six should indicate that they think impossible at the moment to define the particular regime in 
the relations between Turkey and the Common Market.”69 Considering the association with Turkey as “a new 
precedent cited by other countries that are under similar conditions,” he advocated “a non-discriminatory measure that 
can guarantee the freedom of the Community’s future activities.”70 Thus, the French government was afraid the EEC 
would establish similar privileged relations with the other European countries if Turkey was allowed to establish a 
customs union with the EEC member states. 
Hence, the contrasting attitudes of France and West Germany were not solely determined by their bilateral relations 
with Turkey, but rather were largely influenced by the conflict over the fundamental objective of the Community’s 
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From April 1960, when the French territories and Belgian Congo successively attained independence, the future 
relations between the EEC and the independent African countries became controversial. A significant point of 
controversy was whether the EEC should maintain its special relations with the region defined by the Treaty of Rome. 
Backed by Italy and Belgium, France argued that the Community was responsible for sub-Saharan Africa and should 
give priority to providing assistance to that region. In contrast, the Netherlands and West Germany stressed the need 
for assistance towards all developing countries.60 
Under these circumstances, at the Council of Ministers in July 1961, West Germany suggested abolishing specific 
tariff preferences for the ex-colonial African countries and instead reducing the common external tariff.61 It should be 
noted that this proposition was similar to what the Commission had suggested in relation to the association with 
Turkey. According to the German idea, true economic independence of the African countries, which was a primary 
objective of their association with the Community, could be achieved not through tariff preferences but rather by 
strengthening financial assistance to improve African infrastructures and to enable those countries to diversify their 
production. 
The French government insisted on the maintenance of the tariff preference because it would be impossible to 
convince the Africans to accept seemingly more disadvantageous conditions than those of the existing association. 
Thus, leaving aside their economic effectiveness, the French saw a need to maintain the tariff preferences based on 
political considerations. In this sense, the attitudes of France and West Germany regarding the association with the 
sub-Saharan African countries were opposite of those concerning the association with Turkey. Léopold Senghor, 
Senegal’s first president, argued that the German attitude would force the African countries to approach the 
Communist bloc.62 This criticism was based on the same logic used by West Germany to advocate the association 
with Turkey. 
Considering the strong ties linking France and sub-Saharan Africa from the colonial era and those between 
Germany and Turkey from the Ottoman era, it might seem inevitable that France and West Germany came into 
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commercial relations.63 Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the following statement by Rolf Lahr, secretary of state in the 
German Foreign Ministry, at the Council of Ministers in October 1961: “it will be difficult to make the public opinion 
of Turkey admit that this European country [i.e., Turkey], so important for Western Europe, must be treated more 
unfavorably than the African countries that recently achieved independence by the European Economic 
Community.”64 For West Germany, Turkey was not only a traditional partner but also an essential partner as a part of 
European countries. 
In fact, West Germany actively sought to establish special relations with other European counties as well as Turkey. 
In the second half of 1960, Chancellor Adenauer, who was an active supporter of Franco-German entente, was 
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succeeded as the leader of Germany’s European policy by Federal Minister for Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard, who 
sought to build the special relations between the EEC and the EFTA.65 Lahr explained the importance of the EEC’s 
relations with European countries by arguing that “[c]ountries like Switzerland and Austria, which are historically, 
spiritually and economically regarded as the heartland of Europe […] cannot be placed on the same level with Korea, 
Paraguay or Ethiopia.” Lahr was concerned about what he saw as the inadequate progress of the negotiations with 
European countries except for the United Kingdom compared with the negotiations with sub-Saharan Africa. To 
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non-member states in Western Europe. At the same time, however, it could not ignore certain disadvantages that 
accrue from their accession or association: 1) increased economic and financial costs due to more intensified 
competition among the agricultural producer countries and financial assistance to Europe’s developing countries; 2) 
the deterioration of the economic model institutionalized by the Treaty of Rome through a number of exceptions; 3) 
delays in the Community’s activity provoked by the increasing number of member states or associate states; and 4) 
difficulties in constructing a political Europe owing to the intervention of most European countries, which were 
unenthusiastic about the project.68 
In this context, Jean-Marc Bogner, French permanent representative to the EEC, argued that “in view of […] the 
negotiations that the Community is conducting with many European countries that demanded their accession to the 
Treaty of Rome, the Six should indicate that they think impossible at the moment to define the particular regime in 
the relations between Turkey and the Common Market.”69 Considering the association with Turkey as “a new 
precedent cited by other countries that are under similar conditions,” he advocated “a non-discriminatory measure that 
can guarantee the freedom of the Community’s future activities.”70 Thus, the French government was afraid the EEC 
would establish similar privileged relations with the other European countries if Turkey was allowed to establish a 
customs union with the EEC member states. 
Hence, the contrasting attitudes of France and West Germany were not solely determined by their bilateral relations 
with Turkey, but rather were largely influenced by the conflict over the fundamental objective of the Community’s 
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external policy, i.e., whether or not the EEC should give preference to the non-member states in Western Europe. This 
perspective was shared by the EEC Commission, which feared that if the Community agreed on the establishment of 
customs unions with other European countries, then it would be difficult to reject the same for Turkey.71 Therefore, 
to reach an agreement with Turkey, it was indispensable to determine the policy direction towards Western European 
countries as a whole. 
 
4. Conclusion of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 
 
4.1: Final phase of the negotiations: preferential treatment during the preparatory period 
At the beginning in the latter half of 1962, compromises were reached on the external relations of the EEC; 
however, these concerned superficial rather than essential issues. With regard to the association with the sub-Saharan 
African countries, France accepted the reduction of the common external tariff, i.e., the reduction of the tariff 
preference, whereas West Germany accepted its maintenance.72 Nevertheless, the Germans, together with the Dutch, 
continued to have concerns regarding an early conclusion of the agreement and sought to postpone it in some way or 
another.73 
The negotiations with Turkey also made some progress. After being suspended for over a year, negotiations 
between the EEC Commission and the Turkish government resumed in June of 1962. The Turkish delegation 
continued to pursue the establishment of the customs union after the preparatory period, and, to attain this goal, it also 
requested preferential commercial policies applied during the preparatory period.74 As opposed to the approach of 
France and the EEC Commission, which accepted only non-discriminatory measures within the framework of the 
association, Turkey demanded an arrangement for a preferential increase in its exports from the start of the 
preparatory period. As a consequence, the Commission reported to the member states that at least scheduling the 
establishment of the customs union after the preparatory period was indispensable for an agreement with Turkey.75 
At the Council of Ministers in July 1962, the six governments agreed to regard the establishment of the customs 
union as the ultimate goal of the association with Turkey.76 
Krieger concluded that this was the moment when the dispute was practically put to an end because the EEC 
member states and the Commission had been conflicted about whether or not to establish a customs union with 
Turkey.77 However, we must not overlook their reservations: 1) a schedule for the establishment of a customs union 
was not fixed, and a unanimous vote of contracting parties was needed to begin the process and 2) only 
non-discriminatory measures were adopted during the preparatory period.78 The adoption of the non-discriminatory 
policy, i.e., the denial of preferential treatment, was particularly significant, because, in order to enable Turkey to 
establish the customs union, West Germany insisted on the need to adopt preferential policies ensuring the increase of 
Turkish exports during the preparatory period.79 In contrast, France sought to demonstrate that “non-discriminatory 
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measures would be able to meet the main concern of Turkey, i.e., the parity with Greece” for the purpose of avoiding 
the preparatory period to be a practical first step towards the establishment of the customs union.80 In light of these 
considerations, although the EEC member states had agreed to establish the customs union with Turkey, this was not 
a fixed plan but rather merely a vague expression of intention. As the association with Turkey would eventually 
include preferential measures, we should not regard this decision as the practical end of the negotiations. 
For that reason, during the next negotiation round in October, expressing its satisfaction at the EEC’s concession, 
the Turkish delegation persisted in demanding preferential measures during the preparatory period. As a result, 
“significant progress could not be made” in the negotiations.81 Under these circumstances, the EEC Commission, 
which along with France had been unenthusiastic about the establishment of the customs union and insisted on the 
non-discriminatory policy, began to consider the necessity for the agreement to adopt preferential measures at least 
concerning tobacco and dried grapes, which were Turkey’s major export products but also were subject to 
competition from other non-member states.82 Considering the possibility of British accession and other western 
European countries’ association with the Community, the Commission reached the conclusion that Turkey would lead 
to a disadvantageous situation unless preferential measures were adopted.83 
The French government continued to oppose the preferential measures during the preparatory period;84 however, 
the French delegation in Brussels found it was less difficult for the country to soften its attitude because the 
government had accepted the establishment of the customs union as a principle of the association.85 Finally, it 
proposed to accept the Commission’s idea as a working assumption despite recognizing “many difficulties must be 
resolved before we can give definitive approval.”86 This was not necessarily a radical change of position; however, it 
marked a crucial turning point for the conclusion of the association with Turkey. Although the French government 
agreed with the preferential measures on tobacco and dried grapes solely as a working assumption, it was eventually 
reluctant to express its own opinion. As a result, the implementation of the preferential measures was treated as a fait 
accompli. Why did the French become silent about the issue?87 Answering this question is the final task in 
understanding the process of establishing the association with Turkey. 
 
4.2: France’s isolation and the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement 
During the negotiation round held in January 1963, the Turkish delegation requested the application of preferential 
measures not only for tobacco and dried grapes but also for eight additional products.88 This demand was regarded as 
excessive by West Germany and the EEC Commission as well as France. Nevertheless, without protesting the Turkish 
demand, the French permanent representative observed that “[u]nder the circumstances, this question may acquire 
certain importance” because “the conclusion of an association agreement with a third country in the near future is 
indeed likely to demonstrate that the Community maintains undiminished vitality.”89 Thus, considering the current 
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external policy, i.e., whether or not the EEC should give preference to the non-member states in Western Europe. This 
perspective was shared by the EEC Commission, which feared that if the Community agreed on the establishment of 
customs unions with other European countries, then it would be difficult to reject the same for Turkey.71 Therefore, 
to reach an agreement with Turkey, it was indispensable to determine the policy direction towards Western European 
countries as a whole. 
 
4. Conclusion of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 
 
4.1: Final phase of the negotiations: preferential treatment during the preparatory period 
At the beginning in the latter half of 1962, compromises were reached on the external relations of the EEC; 
however, these concerned superficial rather than essential issues. With regard to the association with the sub-Saharan 
African countries, France accepted the reduction of the common external tariff, i.e., the reduction of the tariff 
preference, whereas West Germany accepted its maintenance.72 Nevertheless, the Germans, together with the Dutch, 
continued to have concerns regarding an early conclusion of the agreement and sought to postpone it in some way or 
another.73 
The negotiations with Turkey also made some progress. After being suspended for over a year, negotiations 
between the EEC Commission and the Turkish government resumed in June of 1962. The Turkish delegation 
continued to pursue the establishment of the customs union after the preparatory period, and, to attain this goal, it also 
requested preferential commercial policies applied during the preparatory period.74 As opposed to the approach of 
France and the EEC Commission, which accepted only non-discriminatory measures within the framework of the 
association, Turkey demanded an arrangement for a preferential increase in its exports from the start of the 
preparatory period. As a consequence, the Commission reported to the member states that at least scheduling the 
establishment of the customs union after the preparatory period was indispensable for an agreement with Turkey.75 
At the Council of Ministers in July 1962, the six governments agreed to regard the establishment of the customs 
union as the ultimate goal of the association with Turkey.76 
Krieger concluded that this was the moment when the dispute was practically put to an end because the EEC 
member states and the Commission had been conflicted about whether or not to establish a customs union with 
Turkey.77 However, we must not overlook their reservations: 1) a schedule for the establishment of a customs union 
was not fixed, and a unanimous vote of contracting parties was needed to begin the process and 2) only 
non-discriminatory measures were adopted during the preparatory period.78 The adoption of the non-discriminatory 
policy, i.e., the denial of preferential treatment, was particularly significant, because, in order to enable Turkey to 
establish the customs union, West Germany insisted on the need to adopt preferential policies ensuring the increase of 
Turkish exports during the preparatory period.79 In contrast, France sought to demonstrate that “non-discriminatory 
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measures would be able to meet the main concern of Turkey, i.e., the parity with Greece” for the purpose of avoiding 
the preparatory period to be a practical first step towards the establishment of the customs union.80 In light of these 
considerations, although the EEC member states had agreed to establish the customs union with Turkey, this was not 
a fixed plan but rather merely a vague expression of intention. As the association with Turkey would eventually 
include preferential measures, we should not regard this decision as the practical end of the negotiations. 
For that reason, during the next negotiation round in October, expressing its satisfaction at the EEC’s concession, 
the Turkish delegation persisted in demanding preferential measures during the preparatory period. As a result, 
“significant progress could not be made” in the negotiations.81 Under these circumstances, the EEC Commission, 
which along with France had been unenthusiastic about the establishment of the customs union and insisted on the 
non-discriminatory policy, began to consider the necessity for the agreement to adopt preferential measures at least 
concerning tobacco and dried grapes, which were Turkey’s major export products but also were subject to 
competition from other non-member states.82 Considering the possibility of British accession and other western 
European countries’ association with the Community, the Commission reached the conclusion that Turkey would lead 
to a disadvantageous situation unless preferential measures were adopted.83 
The French government continued to oppose the preferential measures during the preparatory period;84 however, 
the French delegation in Brussels found it was less difficult for the country to soften its attitude because the 
government had accepted the establishment of the customs union as a principle of the association.85 Finally, it 
proposed to accept the Commission’s idea as a working assumption despite recognizing “many difficulties must be 
resolved before we can give definitive approval.”86 This was not necessarily a radical change of position; however, it 
marked a crucial turning point for the conclusion of the association with Turkey. Although the French government 
agreed with the preferential measures on tobacco and dried grapes solely as a working assumption, it was eventually 
reluctant to express its own opinion. As a result, the implementation of the preferential measures was treated as a fait 
accompli. Why did the French become silent about the issue?87 Answering this question is the final task in 
understanding the process of establishing the association with Turkey. 
 
4.2: France’s isolation and the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement 
During the negotiation round held in January 1963, the Turkish delegation requested the application of preferential 
measures not only for tobacco and dried grapes but also for eight additional products.88 This demand was regarded as 
excessive by West Germany and the EEC Commission as well as France. Nevertheless, without protesting the Turkish 
demand, the French permanent representative observed that “[u]nder the circumstances, this question may acquire 
certain importance” because “the conclusion of an association agreement with a third country in the near future is 
indeed likely to demonstrate that the Community maintains undiminished vitality.”89 Thus, considering the current 
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“circumstances,” France became an advocate of the association with Turkey. The “circumstances” were not identified 
in this document; however, this was almost certainly a reference to the crisis situation caused by the refusal of British 
accession to the EEC, which had been declared by de Gaulle on January 14, 1963. 
The refusal of British accession affected not only bilateral relations with the United Kingdom but also damaged the 
EEC’s external relations as a whole. The Netherlands, which had been the most active supporter of British accession, 
did not conceal its discontent with the French unilateralism and even attempted to veto any decisions put to the vote 
at the Council. In addition, the Dutch again began to regard the association with the sub-Saharan African countries as 
a problem and demanded the participation of the ex-British colonies in the association as a condition for its 
agreement.90 
Meanwhile, the association with Turkey gained momentum following the failure of British accession. As its anger 
against France subsided and was replaced by the view that “in any event, the restart is now a slogan,”91 West 
Germany launched an initiative to conclude the association with Turkey. In April 1963, the German government 
published a new guideline for the EEC’s activities, the so-called Schröder plan,92 which was named after Federal 
Minister of the Foreign Affairs Gerhard Schröder, and emphasized the need for the “synchronization” of the 
Community’s actions, which meant the balanced development of internal integration and external relations. Thus, 
West Germany sought to rebuild relations with Western European countries, including the United Kingdom, and to 
conclude the association with Turkey as a condition of the agreement on the process of internal integration, 
particularly regarding the common agricultural policy (CAP).93 Ironically, France’s refusal of British accession led 
the other member states to put greater emphasis on relations with non-member states of Western Europe. 
One of the most controversial points of the Schröder plan concerned the question of whether or not the EEC should 
resume contacts with the United Kingdom. With the exception of France, all of the member states insisted on 
on-going contacts in order not to eliminate the possibility of British accession. In the view of France, what was 
necessary for British accession was not a compromise between the country and the EEC, but rather the United 
Kingdom’s acceptance of the EEC’s policies and institution.94 Therefore, the Schröder plan was unacceptable for 
France in the sense that it aimed at compensating the failure of the accession negotiations from the EEC’s side. 
However, if France rejected the plan, criticism towards the EEC would continue to increase, and probably more 
significantly for France, the realization of the CAP would be uncertain owing to the concept of “synchronization.” 
Under these circumstances, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, the association with Turkey began to be 
regarded as a way to settle the crisis. Since the beginning of 1963, the negotiations had rapidly progressed, and the 
Turkey’s association had gotten close to the Greece’s association. Respecting Turkey’s intention, West Germany 
proposed to formulate regulations concerning the mobility of labor and capital and right of establishment during the 
preparatory period, and it sought to clarify that the period was an integral part of the establishment of the customs 
union.95 The member states agreed to draft an article regarding the future accession of Turkey to the Community 
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without much discussion.96 After the final phase of the negotiations with Turkey, the Commission suggested that the 
preferential commercial measures should target hazelnuts and dried figs in addition to tobacco and dried grapes.97 
France did not oppose these suggestions, and Italy instead became reluctant to form a close association with Turkey 
owing to concerns about market competition.98 Italy dropped its opposition when the other member states offered to 
immediately remove their internal tariffs and introduce the common external tariff on hazelnuts and dried fig so as to 
provide facilities for Italian exports.99 
The Community formed a consensus on these measures during the preparatory period and thus established the 
principles of the association. The only problem that remained to be solved was to reach an agreement with Turkey, 
which had requested the application of preferential measures towards a total of 10 products. During the negotiations 
of May 1963, when the Commission proposed to increase the tariff quotas for tobacco and dried grapes and 
committed to examining additional increases each year, Turkey accepted the preferential measures applied to only 
four products, namely tobacco, dried grapes, hazelnuts, and dried figs.100 On June 25, 1963, the EEC Commission 
and the Turkish government agreed to sign the agreement, and, on September 12, the association agreement between 
Turkey and the EEC, the so-called Ankara Agreement, was concluded. 
The main feature of this association was that it was completed through the two steps, namely the preparatory and 
transitional periods. During the preparatory period, the EEC member states applied preferential commercial policies 
towards Turkish tobacco, dried grapes, dried figs, and hazelnuts.101 Besides, Turkey could receive 175 million units 
of account in loans over a period of five years without diminishing its trade barriers. Therefore, the association during 
the preparatory period was based on the unilateral commitments of the EEC’s side. In contrast, during the transitional 
period, the association had the objective to “establish a customs union progressively on the basis of mutual and 
balanced obligations,” which would be similar to the association with Greece. Most symbolically, “the possibility of 
the accession of Turkey to the Community” was expressed in the agreement. 
Therefore, this agreement retained an ambiguous character: on the one hand, it maintained the concept of the 
preparatory period, the purpose of which was to discriminate Turkey from Greece; on the other hand, like the 
association with Greece, it set a goal of establishing a customs union and pursuing the future accession of Turkey. As 
a result, the EEC granted Turkey a more preferential status than that of Greece. It was reasonable that the Greek 
government protested the conclusion of the Turkey’s association and could not “help but express the deep 
disappointment caused by the attitude of the European Economic Community member states.”102 
  In Turkey, the signing of the Ankara Agreement had an almost festival-like quality. Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin 
said, “this agreement crowns the fundamental westernization revolutions of Atatürk by tightly binding Turkey to 
Western Europe.” A Turkish newspaper, Akşam (Evening), published an article entitled “Turkey Now an Inseparable 
Part of Europe.”103 Thus, from the Turkish viewpoint, the EEC countries finally accepted Turkey’s Europeanness 
through the association agreement, which guaranteed Turkey’s status equal to Greece. 
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“circumstances,” France became an advocate of the association with Turkey. The “circumstances” were not identified 
in this document; however, this was almost certainly a reference to the crisis situation caused by the refusal of British 
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agreement.90 
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necessary for British accession was not a compromise between the country and the EEC, but rather the United 
Kingdom’s acceptance of the EEC’s policies and institution.94 Therefore, the Schröder plan was unacceptable for 
France in the sense that it aimed at compensating the failure of the accession negotiations from the EEC’s side. 
However, if France rejected the plan, criticism towards the EEC would continue to increase, and probably more 
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Under these circumstances, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, the association with Turkey began to be 
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Turkey’s association had gotten close to the Greece’s association. Respecting Turkey’s intention, West Germany 
proposed to formulate regulations concerning the mobility of labor and capital and right of establishment during the 
preparatory period, and it sought to clarify that the period was an integral part of the establishment of the customs 
union.95 The member states agreed to draft an article regarding the future accession of Turkey to the Community 
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a result, the EEC granted Turkey a more preferential status than that of Greece. It was reasonable that the Greek 
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―Reconsidering the origin of EU-Turkey relations―
However, as this article has clarified, these results did not imply the EEC placed Turkey above Greece. Rather, the 
differentiation of Turkey from Greece was an entrenched idea within the Community. When the association with 
Turkey was concluded in 1963, the Community was united not in responding to the Turkey’s demand itself, but rather 
in demonstrating success through an agreement with non-member states. In this context, the speech by Walter 
Hallstein, then president of the EEC Commission, at the signing ceremony is rather interesting: “Turkey is a part of 
Europe. This is the deepest meaning of this operation. […] Turkey is a part of Europe: this is above all the memory of 
the strong personality of Ataturk. […] Turkey is a part of Europe: that is why, according to the standards in force 
today, it establishes the constitutional relations with the European Community.”104 The repetition of the phrase, 
“Turkey is a part of Europe,” did not reflect an intrinsic aspect of the agreement. Rather, in concluding the association, 
Hallstein could not help reminding himself that “Turkey is a part of Europe.” 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has clarified that although the association with Greece and that with Turkey had similar characteristics, 
there were significant differences in the process to establish each association. Indeed, this has been pointed out in 
previous studies; however, this article has revealed the different attitudes towards Greece and Turkey in relation to the 
EEC’s negotiations with other European countries and sub-Saharan African countries. From this perspective, the 
fundamental character of the association between Turkey and the EEC, particularly the establishment of the customs 
union, could not be easily established because the association was concerned not only with the Community’s relations 
with Turkey and Greece but also its general external relations. Since August 1961, when the United Kingdom applied 
for its accession to the Community and other European countries also began pursuing accession or association, the 
association between Turkey and the EEC was considered to serve as a precedent for relations with other European 
countries. That is why West Germany pursued a close association with Turkey and stressed the need to establish 
special relations with the Western European countries, whereas France adopted a more negative attitude concerning 
the Turkey’s capacity to associate with the Community and preferred to maintain the special relations with its 
ex-colonies. 
In an exceptional situation, namely the crisis of early 1963, the nature of the association was determined, and the 
agreement was concluded. While France became isolated within the Community because of the rejection of British 
accession, the other member states, particularly West Germany, were able to make efforts to mend relations with 
Western European countries using the association with Turkey as a lever. It is for this reason that Turkey’s special 
position was transient. Its particular position was not justified by Turkey’s attitude per se but by the tactical value that 
Turkey possessed to strengthen relations between the EEC members and the other Western European countries. 
Although this aspect of the process of establishing the association has generally been forgotten, the provision that 
Turkey would be a full member of the Community and Hallstein’s statement that “Turkey is a part of Europe” are still 
remembered. This is the misunderstanding that lies at the root of the problematic relation between Turkey and the EU. 
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Abstract 
 
Marine Plastic Litter (MPL) has become one of the most important agendas of international environmental 
policy. Research on international cooperation is required, focusing on countries that are heavily involved in 
environmental pollution (“major contributing countries.”). However, previous research has not fully described 
the function of variables that influence a country’s decision to join international environmental regimes. To 
address this problem, this article will conduct a case study of the U.S. decision, which rejected the Ocean Plastics 
Charter but joined the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision and the G20 Implementation Framework for Actions on Marine 
Plastic Litter, by analyzing the following question: “why did the U.S., as a major contributing country in the 
field of MPL, decided to join the G20 regime but rejected the G7 regime on MPL?” This question will be 
discussed through two perspectives: (1) differences between the G7 regime and the G20 regime on MPL and (2) 
the U.S. stance on MPL under the Trump administration. This article concludes that the two variables: (1) in-
volvement of other major contributing countries, and (2) flexibility of policy approaches, function as conditions 
for the decision of a major contributing country about whether or not to join an international environmental 
regime.    
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